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HUSBANDS & WIvEs, DANGEROUSNESS & DEPENDENCE:

PUBLIC PENSIONS IN THE 1860s-1920s
SUSAN STERET*

I. INTRODUCTION
Everyone needs a wife. That is, we all could use a person in our
lives who fits the once-idealized image of a wife: doing the laundry,
cooking, caring for children, arranging medical appointments, managing
a social life, and attending to emotional needs. In this list of what makes
one a wife in a marriage, the most established of heterosexual institutions, I have not included heterosexual intercourse. Heterosexuality entails much more than who is sexually involved with whom, and anyone
who has ever said she needs a wife knows that.
The purpose of this article is to discuss meanings of heterosexuality
in the context of state benefits, focusing on the emergence of benefits in
the nineteenth century. Not only did the late-nineteenth century engender
the emergence of state benefits alongside expanding state employment,
but that period also fostered an understanding of heterosexuality or homosexuality as a characteristic of individuals, rather than a description of
behavior. Appellate courts, when determining who could receive benefits, considered proper family roles in deciding whether people had
earned state payments or could only gain them as a matter of charity.
Because an understanding of fixed sexual identities was just being
created in the latter part of the nineteenth century, it is anachronistic to
impose categories of heterosexuality on the state's evaluation of wife and
husband. However, I am not trying to understand distribution of state
benefits on its own terms, but rather as a way of addressing state definition of marriage.
Benefits programs merit examination for two reasons. First, by the
1890s federal civil war pensions comprised over forty percent of the federal budget.' Second, pensions premised upon post-retirement payment
for services rendered constitute the ongoing model for pensions many
workers today receive through employers and for old age social security
payments. The latter part of the nineteenth century saw a significant reconstitution of governance, with states expanding civil service employment and changing from a format of segmented politics, in which those
* Professor of Political Science, University of Denver. I wish to thank Eric Heinze and the
participants and organizers of the InterSEXionality Symposium.
1. See Megan J. McClintock, Civil War Pensions and the Reconstruction of Union Families,
83 J. AM. HIST. 456, 458 (1996).
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who specifically benefited paid for the benefits, to a system that assumed
that state payments, when justified, benefit society as a whole.2 As a result, states began to seriously and more explicitly examine the values of
work and state benefits, which illuminated what it meant to serve society
by emphasizing qualities of masculinity.
This article first discusses ambiguities in understanding what signifies heterosexuality and homosexuality. This article then examines the
administration of Civil War pensions in the late-nineteenth century. The
article closes with an analysis of decisions concerning the constitutionality of pensions.

II. STRAIGHT AND QUEER
Adrienne Rich, in her generative article on compulsory heterosexuality,3 argues that there is a lesbian continuum: that many women live
rather closely with other women.4 Women have friendships with other
women, work with other women, gossip with other women, live with
other women, share child care with other women, and are sometimes
sexually involved with other women. It is only the latter that guarantees
that one will be counted as lesbian; everything else is simply what we
expect of all women in this culture. Rich's work implies two possible
explanations for the fact that women's lives closely revolve around other
women though most women identify as heterosexual. First, pressure to
be heterosexual is so overwhelming that we simply cannot know how
women would understand and define their sexuality without such pressure! Alternatively, women are naturally and essentially lesbian, and that
cultural heterosexuality requires the apparatus of social pressure and
coercion to keep women from primarily sharing our lives with other
women.6 The latter reading suggests an essential sexuality, that there is
no ambiguity and uncertainty in how one sexually identifies. Rich leaves
unanswered the question of whether this structure is biologically or socially created: who wouldn't want to live with women? Rich argues that
given the range and magnitude of social pressure to be straight, combined with the varied penalties for living primarily with other women,
heterosexuality is compulsory. Therefore, historically we can not know
what sexual identity women would have chosen in the absence of wage

2.

See generally ROBIN EINHORN, PROPERTY RULES: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN CHICAGO

1833-1872 (1991) (discussing the evolvement of Chicago's economic policy).
3. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexualityand Lesbian Existence, in THE LESBIAN AND
GAY STUDIES READER 227 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
4. See id. at 239.
5. See id. at 229.
6. See id. at 235.
7. See id. at 241.
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disparities between men and women, societal discrimination, witch
burnings, and patriarchal control of law, theology, and science.8
Recently, queer theory has attempted to shift the focus of sexual
identity analysis away from an examination of the people for whom one
feels sexual desire-which could include many different people-and
those with whom one is sexually involved-which at any particular time
could be no one.' The people we sexually desire or with whom we are
sexually involved do not define or exhaust our whole lives. In recent
popular culture, the wide variety of indicators of straightness or gayness
have been noted, particularly with regard to gay men. In a radio broadcast, Dan Savage discussed going to his first workshop on adoption after
he and his boyfriend had decided to adopt." The workshop began by
urging couples to deal with their infertility, a problem common to many,
but not all, heterosexual couples seeking adoptive children. 2 Savage
noted that he and his boyfriend could have skipped this part of the orientation. 3 They had always accepted as fact that they could not biologically have children, rather than as something that ran counter to their
expectations and visions of what their lives would be.' Both straight and
gay couples could not conceive children without becoming entangled in a
complicated arrangement with a third party to make one of the partners a
biological parent. The language of the seminar about infertility, Savage
argued, was the language of coming out." Couples were urged to tell
their friends and family of their situation, to accept what they could not
change, and eventually see it as a positive, new way of making a family. 6
Just as the straight couples shared in an element of gayness, Savage argued he and his boyfriend were appearing a little bit straight by adopting
a child and creating a nuclear family. Savage argued against seeing the
desire to have children as gay or straight. 7
If straight and queer are sometimes difficult to define, and if they
blur, it might be useful to examine where and how the terms are made
explicit. What is it that makes people straight or queer? How have legal
8. See id. at 231.
9. Cf. Judith Butler, Imitation & Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN
THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 13 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991) (discussing the impossibility of defining "lesbian"); Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and SameSex Marriage,75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1599-1601 (pointing out the limitations of defining homosexuality by sexual desire).
10. See, e.g., IN AND OUT (Paramount 1997) (exploring the implications of stereotypically gay
behavior); see also Ellen (ABC television broadcast, 1997) (drawing attention to lesbian existence).
11. All Things Considered: Gay Adoption (National Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 19, 1997)
(transcript information available at <http://www.npr.org/inside/transcripts> (visited Sept. 4, 1998))
[hereinafter Gay Adoption].
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
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institutions categorized sexuality? When these questions are addressed, it
is usually in terms of homosexuality. Andrew Koppelman argues that
discrimination against gays and lesbians should count as gender discrimination on two grounds. 8 First, this kind of discrimination rests upon
the belief that it is wrong for a man to do things with a man that it would
be acceptable to do with a woman.'9 This reasoning has worked, to the
benefit of gays and lesbians, in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), °
which has recently held that discrimination against transsexuals is prohibited by the sex discrimination provisions of the Equal Treatment Directive. According to the ECJ, a person who is fired because she is undergoing or has undergone gender reassignment is being treated unfavorably in comparison with people of the sex to which she was born. 2'
English courts have subsequently referred a case to the ECJ involving
discrimination against a gay man based on the belief that the case regarding transsexuals almost certainly outlaws all discrimination on the
basis of sexual identity."
Second, Koppelman argues discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation should also be considered gender discrimination because gay
men are often the victims of discrimination for behavior that is considered stereotypically female.23 They are discriminated against as though
they are women, although perhaps more aggressively because behavior
that might be accepted for women is unacceptable for men. Similarly,
lesbians are discriminated against for behavior that would seem appropriate for men. ' Koppelman also argues that "the two stigmas, sexinappropriateness and homosexuality, are virtually interchangeable, and
each is readily used as a metaphor for the other."' For example, in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,' a prominent sex discrimination case, a woman
was denied partnership because she needed to go to charm school and did
18. See Andrew Koppelman, Why DiscriminationAgainst Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination,69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994).
19. Id. at 219.
20. The ECJ is a supranational court that judges disputes arising within the fifteen-member
European Union under European Community law. See SALLY J. KENNEY, FOR WHOSE
PROTECTION? REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS AND EXCLUSIONARY POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND

BRITIAN 78-83 (1992) (discussing the impact of the ECJ on British law). The Council of Ministers,
which includes a representative from each member state, outlines directives that set objectives for
the Union as a whole. See id. at 79-80. Directives allow member states choices in how to meet
objectives. See id. The Equal Treatment Directive was enacted in 1976. See id. at 80.
21. See Case C-13/94, P v. S, 2 C.M.L.R. 247 (1996).
22. See R v. Secretary of State for Defence, exparte Perkins, [1997] I.R.L.R. 297.
23. See Koppelman, supra note 18, at 202-03 (discussing how discrimination against homosexuals is part of the larger gender discrimination).
24. Id. at 245-46.
25. Id. at 235.
26. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (superseded by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (making it unlawful for
employers to classify employees or applicants for employment by race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in a way that would deprive that person of employment or adversely affect his or her
status as an employee)).
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not wear make-up.' Of course, women can also be discriminated against
for seeming to be too feminine.'
Using the range of behaviors that constitute lesbian and gay identity
as a basis for identifying someone as queer can work to put gay and lesbian identity at risk.' That is, a person can call herself queer without
paying the public price of being explicitly paired with a same sex partner. Erasure does not have to be the only choice available in dismantling
normative heterosexuality; as Suzanna Walters argues, it should be entirely possible for an individual to have a straight identity while being
politically committed to equality with regard to sexual orientation. Despite ambiguities in race and the recognition that race is not a sensible
biological construct, we do not, as a matter of political and analytical
argument, erase the categories of Black, White, Asian, and Latino.3'
Some queer theorists have emphasized "gender bending"32 in sexual play,
arguing that it is possible to have a queer heterosexuality in the sense that
one might be heterosexually active while subverting standard gender
norms of what it means to be feminine or masculine.3 Such an argument
gains strength as we note that an individual's sexuality is indeed marked
in a number of ways in our culture.' Celia Kitzinger and Susan Wilkinson argue that the possibility of variety in sexual play does not mean that
many people engage in it, and that few heterosexual women writing
about sexuality believe that it is very possible to play with sexuality in a
way that subverts gender norms. They also argue that an emphasis on
the range of play available to women who lead relatively privileged lives,
who are less subject to financial and social pressures, ignores the compulsory nature of heterosexuality and straight gender norms that pervade
the lives of many women. 6

27. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
28. See id. at 251 (stating that stereotyping puts women in the intolerable position of never
being able to advance).
29. See generally Suzanna Danuta Walters, From Here to Queer: Radical Feminism, Postmodernism, and the Lesbian Menace (Or, Why Can'ta Woman Be More Like a Fag?), 21 SIGNS 830
(1996) (discussing the definitions of gay/lesbian issues and their effect).
30. See id. at 844-45.
31. See id. at 832-33.
32. Cf.Mary Anne C. Case, DisaggregatingGenderfrom Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995) (illustrating that
how effeminate men are regarded in society impacts the struggle against gender discrimination in
general); Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities &
Inter-Connectivities, 5 S.CAL. REV. L. & WoMEN'S STuD. 25, 30 (1995) (arguing that although the
author is physically excluded from the category of lesbian, he includes himself to "poke at the
sex/gender essentialisms that rigidly and absurdly confine us all").
33. See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY
STUDIES READER, supra note 3, at 45, 55.
34. See generally id. (discussing the concept of homosexuality through literature and culture).
35. See Celia Kitzinger & Susan Wilkinson, Virgins and Queers RehabilitatingHeterosexuality?, 8 GENDER & Soc'Y 444, 445,457 (1994).
36. See id. at 459.
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We could avoid the problem of erasing gay and lesbian identity by
turning the focus to the markings of heterosexuality. Judith Butler writes
in extraordinarily thought-provoking ways about confounding the fixed
nature of sexual identity, but does not thereby suggest that identity is a
matter of free play or that heterosexuality is not compulsory. 7 Instead,
she argues for the importance of focusing on the masquerade of gender
within heterosexuality rather than on lesbian identity." The claim to a
specific lesbian identity has been a "counterpoint to the claim that lesbian sexuality is just heterosexuality once removed, or that it is derived,
or that it does not exist."" Claiming lesbian sexuality means accepting
preconceived notions of lesbian identity, so that claiming lesbian identity
is inherently accepting a subordinate status within a dominant heterosexuality, Butler bypasses the question of lesbian specificity, instead
addressing the other half of the problem: the assumed authenticity of
heterosexuality. She argues that "[c]ompulsory heterosexuality sets itself
up as the original, the true, the authentic; the norm that determines the
real implies that "being" lesbian is always a kind of miming .... .," An
important move in queer theory would be to avoid the continued focus on
what makes up a true lesbian identity in favor of trying to understand
how heterosexuality is not natural, true, or essential." If heterosexuality
is not natural, true, or essential, then lesbianism cannot consequently be
the tainted derivative of something true. Similarly, Lisa Duggan argues
that focusing on the construction of gay and lesbian sexuality "tends to
leave heterosexuality in its naturalized place." 2 Therefore, it is important
to analyze the extent of heterosexual privilege established in law and
public policy. 3 These approaches both avoid assuming an essential identity while at the same time refusing to focus on the range of play possible
within heterosexuality-as Kitzinger and Wilkinson argue queer theory
too often does." Instead, the invitation is to focus on how ordinary heterosexuality is understood.
Butler's framework resolves some of the ambiguity in Rich's argument. It is simply not worth trying to determine if women's authentic
sexuality rests with other women, as one reading of Rich would suggest.
Instead, there is no true and authentic way to be gay, lesbian or straight,
because all sexual identities are assumed. Butler argues:

37. See Butler, supra note 9, at 21.
38. Id. at 17.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 20.
41. Id. at 20-21.
42. Lisa Duggan, Queering the State, 39 Soc. TEXT 1 (1994), reprinted in SEX WARS:
SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE 179, 185 (Lisa Duggan & Nan D. Hunter eds., 1995)
(subsequent citations to Queeringthe State will reference the article as reprinted in SEX WARS).
43. See id. at 186.
44. See Kitzinger & Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 458-59.
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There is no "proper" gender, a gender proper to one sex rather than
another, which is in some sense that sex's cultural property. Where
that notion of the "proper" operates, it is always and only improperly
installed as the effect of a compulsory system. Drag constitutes the
mundane way in which genders are appropriated, theatricalized, worn
and done; it implies that all gendering is a kind of impersonation and
approximation.
If masculine characteristics do not naturally belong to men, and feminine
characteristics do not naturally belong to women, we can attend to the
work that goes into maintaining what are taken to be proper boundaries.
However, analyses of compulsory heterosexuality in law have focused
primarily upon sexual intercourse despite the range of ways sexuality and
identities can be understood.'
Heterosexuality might be best understood by approaching it as a
question of gender norms. Compulsory heterosexuality might not be primarily enforced via law regarding what constitutes sexual intercourse,
but rather by what sets the context in which men and women are understood to be heterosexual. An analysis of the system of early benefit payments illustrates this point.
III. STATE BENEFITS FOR DANGEROUS PUBLIC SERVICE
This article discusses two major points related to nineteenth-century
state payments' effect on heterosexuality: first, that the practicalities of
gaining state benefits enforced heterosexuality by requiring women to
associate with men, and second, that the law surrounding state payments
articulated and enforced a notion of the "proper." 7 Pension payments
went to men whom courts identified as acting appropriately through
definitions of dangerous work. That this work was a performance is enhanced by imagined dangerousness, regardless of whether the Work actually placed the performer in physical jeopardy.
Analyzing the availability of state benefits clearly involves discussing compulsory heterosexuality: women had to associate or live with
men in order to receive payments. 8 Whatever room for complexity there
might have been in one's living arrangements, as a matter of legal recog45. Butler, supra note 9, at 21.
46. See generally Richard Collier, "The Art of Living the Married Life": Representations of
Male Heterosexuality in Law, 1 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 543 (1992) (discussing how the law has used
marriage to define a "natural" sexual intercourse); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation: the Power of Discourse, Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality,
49 VAND. L. REv. 869 (1996) (discussing how society defines rape and its impact on women's
sexuality).
47. See Butler, supra note 9, at 21 (addressing "compulsory" gender norms).
48. Indeed, normative heterosexuality is well-established enough that I doubt it would be
possible to find a case of a man even trying to claim benefits on the basis of his affiliation with
another man, separate from being a son or father; particularly since marriage or something that
mimicked marriage was required to claim benefits and marriage was defined as a heterosexual

union.
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nition, heterosexuality was enforced. However, understanding the masculine characteristics that allowed for the state benefits is a slightly different matter. By focusing on masculinity, we address Butler's point that
gender is appropriated and approximated rather than intrinsic: 9 In addressing masculinity, we are no longer addressing sexual orientation-at
least in the sense of sexual desire or who must live with whom to get
state benefits. Instead, gender, usually the category we use for discussing
masculinity and femininity, subsumes sexual orientation. In other words,
whom one desires sexually constitutes merely one aspect of a person's
gender. Yet focusing on masculinity and femininity would seem to erase
lesbian and gay identity-an ironic result given that the emergence of
more fixed state regulatory apparatuses in the late-nineteenth century in
part conditioned the emergence of sexual identity.'
The framework of sexual identity, or of queer theory, could as easily
be said to encompass the framework of gender. That is, instead of saying
that all of sexual orientation concerns masculinity and femininity, which
is in turn about gender, we could say that all of gender is about signaling
masculinity and femininity, which is in turn about sexual orientation.
Feminist theory has argued there is no essential human being called
"woman" who shares characteristics across all women.' Where there are
patterns of shared outlooks and characteristics, they are dependent on
race and class position, as well as sexuality.52 The fragmentation of a
subject called "woman" has come from the challenges raised by members of marginalized groups, and that includes challenges raised from
queer theory. As Eric Heinze argues, transsexuals, who have been at the
forefront of challenges to discrimination-on the basis of sexual identity in
the European supranational courts, raise the most explicit challenges to
"categories, such as gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, religion or language, as well as non-categories, such as the 'human family' or the abstract individual." 3 If, for example, birth certificates are not changed to
reflect a transsexual's new sex, then marriage for a transsexual is, from
the point of view of the state, same-sex marriage. '
Heinze argues that while it might be analytically useful to separate
out discourses of classical sexology, gender, and sexual orientation, and
while their theoretical bases have different origins, disjoining these
frameworks eventually shows how they overlap.5 When these discourses
49. See Butler, supra note 9, at 21.
50. I am grateful to Eric Heinze for bringing this point to my attention.
51. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1990) (recognizing that Westem philosophy concerning "womanness" does not consider the vast, inherent differences of women).
52. See, e.g., PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT (1991) (centering the
analysis deliberately on African-American women).
53. Eric Heinze, Discoursesof Sex: Classical,Modernist and Post-Modernist,67 NORDIC J.
INT'L L. 37, 72 (1998).
54. See id. at 68.
55. See id. at 40.
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are separated, they are only so in their most polar versions; once one
complicates an understanding of gender, one is quickly in the midst of
discussions of queer theory. As Heinze puts it, "[f]or no sub-discourse
within any of the three sites truly can be understood as irrelevant to the
other two sites. Appearing, perhaps, to bypass ('disjoin') the other two
sites, a disjunctive sub-discourse in fact collapses ('conjoins') these into
itself."56 Rather than this leading to the meaninglessness of the categories,
Heinze argues that it would instead be useful to proliferate categories by
joining them together." He maps the discourse of sexual orientation onto
postmodernist forms of knowledge, which emphasize the fragmentation
of the legal subject. 8 He argues that the feminist project, in contrast,
emerged more from the emphasis on programmatic modernism embodied
in arguments for universal human rights.59 Heinze also argues that the
very artificiality of these conjunctions invites us to proliferate the categories: that it would be helpful to think about what it might look like to
explore and link liberal, modernist, and postmodernist perspectives about
gender, sexuality, and orientation.'
In a different context, that of understanding the conjunction of local
with global, Donna Haraway also argues for the usefulness of using categories whose very artificiality is evident: it will keep us from deluding
ourselves that we are discussing something real, concrete, and separable
from everything else.' With these points in mind in the forthcoming discussion of the enforcement of heterosexuality in pensions law I do not
mean to analyze which assumptions are about gender and which are
about heterosexuality. I am not convinced they are wholly separable,
though for some purposes the distinctions might be important. Instead, I
argue that characteristics we would associate with gender, such as courage for men and dependence for women, concern sexual orientation. In
court cases, the characteristics of socially gendered masculinity or femininity arose in situations where courts also assumed these characteristics
to be important because men, women, and children were in heterosexual
families, or should be.
In addressing masculinity, femininity, and assumptions about family, we do not resolve some questions, such as what it really means to be
"straight," and if heterosexual desire ever authentically belongs to
women. But in keeping with analyses that view sexuality as about much
more than for whom one has sexual desires, we can analyze the maintenance in law of heterosexuality as a set of beliefs about how men and
women should live together. These laws have enforced a normative het56. Id. at 48-49.
57. Id. at 40.
58. Id. at 62-67.
59. Id. at 56-60.
60. Id. at 73-75.
61. Donna J. Haraway, Reading Buchi Emecheta: Contests for "Women's Experience" in
Women's Studies, in SIMIANS, CYBORGS AND WOMEN 109,111-13 (1991).
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erosexuality, formalizing relationships that might have once been informal and more fluid.
While the law of state benefits enforced a heterosexual and monogamous version of family, it nonetheless allowed some social space
for making things up as one went along. Legal categories did not regulate
everything. To the extent that homosexuality was not identified as a
quality of individuals until the late-nineteenth century in the United
States," women could and did arrange their lives so that they could live
together with each other, and they could do so under very little public
scrutiny or disapproval.63 D'Emilio and Freedman discuss same sex couples who lived married lives between the 1850s and 1870s.' In each couple, one partner took on the position of husband or wife in a way that fit
established heterosexual practices, but also took on a position different
from what might have been signified by biological sex. Butler's notion
that all of gender is a "drag," even if it is not one that people can take
off or put on at will, makes it difficult to say that the partnerships
D'Emilio and Freedman describe are straight or gay/lesbian. To argue
the latter imputes tremendous significance to biological sex and much
less to what we take seriously in the social world. Furthermore, D'Emilio
and Freedman argue that to impose categories of heterosexuality or homosexuality is exactly that: an imposition, because such categories were
not common
ways of categorizing people until the late-nineteenth cen67
tury.
In the nineteenth century, women could very rarely earn enough to
support themselves.' Also, understandings of what it meant to be a
proper wife were enforced even where married women earned their own
wages; they were enforced in a way that made it difficult for women to
protect their earnings from husbands.' Not until 1887 did most states
have statutes protecting married women's access to their own wages.'

62. JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATrERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY INAMERICA 121 (1988); see also id. at 128-29 (discussing Walt Whitman as an example of nineteenth-century romance between same sex friends).
63. See id. at 121.
64. Id. at 124-27.
65. See id. at 127.
66. Butler, supra note 9, at 18-21.
67. See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at 121, 123.
68. See id. at 124-25.
69. See Valentine v. Tantum, 32 A. 531, 531-32 (Del. Super. Ct. 1886), cited in Amy Dru
Stanley, ConjugalBonds and Wage Labor:Rights of Contract in the Age of Emancipation,75 J. AM.
HIST. 471, 471 (1988) (outlining the state of women's property rights at common law prior to the
enactment of the "Married Woman's Act" and noting that married women had no right to contract at
common law).
70. See, e.g., Act to Protect the Rights of Married Women, 1861 Colo. Sess. Laws 152, 152
("[A]ny married woman, while married, may bargain, sell and convey her personal and real property,
and enter into any contracts in reference to the same as if she were sole."); see also Reva B. Siegel,
Home As Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880,
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Indeed, many courts interpreted the statutes so that women could only
keep their wages if they lived separately from their husbands.7' They
could not keep wages necessary for domestic duties, and where married
couples mingled their incomes, the women lost title to their earnings and
possessions.72 "Taking in boarders, nursing the sick, canning fruit, working as a seamstress for five dollars a week, running a hotel-such enterprises were all deemed part of the domestic labor the wife owed as the
'helpmate of her husband.""' If pensions were any kind of substantial
contribution to earnings, the public enforcement of heterosexuality
through pensions regulations allowed some financial freedom that could
allow women a choice other than remarrying. As early as the antebellum
period, women's rights activists argued that marriage was legalized
prostitution when women had no choice but to marry, given the low
wages working women faced."
Women began working for wages and supporting children in the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries as wage labor replaced agricultural labor, often bringing the work home to children or children to
the work." Some women did have alternatives. Politically engaged elite
women of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries sometimes
arranged their lives so as to live with close female friends. Women such
as Molly Dewson, active in Roosevelt's New Deal, and Eleanor Roosevelt lived with women, vacationed with women, and strategized about
politics with women. 6 Among social welfare activists, very few of the
white women were married." Possibly these options were much more
available to elite women-just as Kitzinger and Wilkinson note that
playing with sexuality is perhaps more possible for women in relatively
privileged positions today 7-in jobs and social settings where they were

103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1083-89 (1994) (discussing state Married Women's Acts); Stanley, supra note
69, at 481-82 (discussing state Married Women's Act).
71. See Stanley, supra note 69, at 495-96 & n.58 (citing Burke v. Cole, 97 Mass. 113, 114
(1867), and Brooks v. Schwerin, 54 N.Y. 343, 348-49 (1873)).
72. See id. at 496-97.
73. Id.at 496.
74. See Siegel, supra note 70, at 1120-22, 1127-29.
75. Practices varied by ethnicity and region of the country. For discussions of women at work,
see THOMAS DUBLIN, TRANSFORMING WOMEN'S WORK: NEW ENGLAND LIVES IN THE INDUSTRIAL

REVOLUTION (1994) (discussing the effect of the Industrial Revolution on women's work); ALICE
KESSLER-HARRIS, A WOMAN'S WAGE: HISTORICAL MEANINGS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
(1990) (discussing wages as an interpreter and consequence of gender inequality); Elizabeth H.
Pleck, A Mother's Wages: Income EarningAmong Married Italian and Black Women, 1896-1911,
in A HERITAGE OF HER OWN (Nancy F. Cott & Elizabeth H. Pleck eds., 1979) (discussing the historical differences in the workplace between women of different ethnic groups).
76. See BLANCHE WIESEN COOK, 1 ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 339 (1992). John D'Emilio and
Estelle Freedman discuss the late-nineteenth-century emergence of educated women who could
afford to live apart from men, and did. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at 188-97.
77. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED 43, 113 (1993).
78. See Kitzinger & Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 454-57. However, cities have long had
substantial working class lesbian communities even given the difficult circumstances of discrimina-
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less subject to pressures for gender conformity. It was in the latenineteenth century, too, that supervision of morals in the distribution of
Civil War pensions became more entrenched. 9 State benefits were consolidated at a time when some women were first able to make their own
livings, which possibly made the enforcement of heterosexual norms
more important. Public policy, though, envisioned women as dependent
and, indeed, employers justified paying women lower wages by the belief that most did not need the money.'
Public pensions were first available to men. As this article later discusses, public service in the nineteenth century was service which was
regarded as dangerous; typically, military service, service as a volunteer
fireman and, as public employment expanded, service as a policeman.' It
was only after public employment expanded into fields that would employ women, such as school teaching, that it would include characteristics generally imagined as feminine rather than masculine. Courts imagined these occupations, such as volunteer firemen, in ways that had men
as the central actors and, indeed, they were jobs largely held by men.82
When men holding these jobs died-in the Civil War or, later, in industrial accidents-women could gain access to support payments (meager
though they might have been) without having a man in the house, and
they could gain those payments as a matter of statutory entitlement rather
than as a matter of charity.83 They gained those payments through a normatively enforced public fixing of heterosexuality, yet once the payments were gained, legal 6fficials might have very little to say concerning their living arrangements. ' Then, if heterosexuality were enforced, it
would have been through gossip and whispers rather than through formal
legal rules.
I next turn to a discussion of some of the cases concerning the constitutionality of soldiers' pensions, firemen's pensions, and workmen's
compensation. These programs were all tested under state constitutional
provisions that either explicitly stated or had read into them limits on
state spending, allowing states to spend only for a public purpose.' In

tion. See ELIZABETH LAPOVSKY KENNEDY & MADELINE D. DAVIS, BOOTS OF LEATHER, SLIPPERS
OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF A LESBIAN COMMUNITY (1994) (studying Buffalo, New York).
79. See discussion infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text (discussing the intrusive supervision of Civil War pensions).
80. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 75, at 8-9.
81. See discussion infra Parts IV-VI.
82. See, e.g., Trustees of Exempt Firemen's Benevolent Fund v. Roome, 93 N.Y. 313 (1883).
83.

THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS 107 (1992).

84. Cf. Susan Sterett, Serving the State: Consitutionalismand Social Spending, 1860s-1920s,
22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 311, 345 (1994) (discussing that indigence was the only consideration when
determining whether or not a mother should receive a pension).
85. See, e.g., Fire Dep't v. Noble, 3 E.D. Smith 440, 451 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1854) (evaluating
firemen's pension under N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6); see also infra Part V (addressing the constitutionality of pensions).
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addition, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause' was interpreted by the Supreme Court to allow spending only for a public purpose.87 Thus, the legitimacy of spending by any state could always be
raised in court, whatever the content of a state's constitutional provisions. The reasoning was that to spend state money for something other
than a public purpose was to spend tax money illegitimately, which in
turn is to take property without due process of law or just compensation."
The requirement that states could only spend for a public purpose was
considered to be a part of the general law, and Thomas Cooley synthesized that notion as such in his 1876 treatise on taxation." Cooley tied the
requirement to constitutional provisions prohibiting states from taking
property without compensation." However, many states also enacted
specific state constitutional provisions after the Civil War prohibiting the
states from giving gifts to private corporations or individuals, in part a
response to the granting of privileges to railroads." States evaluated pensions under these provisions as well.
In addition to examining the constitutionality of pensions and the
way that masculinity and femininity were imagined in the courts, I want
to illustrate the enforcement of heterosexuality through a discussion of
Megan McClintock's work on the administration of civil war pensions. 2
The administration of pensions was not usually addressed as a constitutional matter in appellate courts. As McClintock's work so richly illuminates, the administration of pensions did, however, enforce an understanding of what constituted a family, an understanding of the proper
behavior which made one a wife. 3
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PENSIONS
By the time of the Civil War, pensions for military service from the
federal government had been long established.' Federal pensions would

86. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1 ("[Nlor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .....
87. See Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664-65 (1874).
88. See Loan Ass'n, 87 U.S. at 662-67.
89. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION 100 (1876).
90. Id. at 73-74, 101.
91. See Louis HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 123-28 (1948) (discussing the development of state constitutional provisions); see also Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853) (allowing local governmental investment upon state legislative authorization); HARTZ, supra, at 113-23 (discussing Sharpless and noting that this decision provided the
impetus for the amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution). For a discussion of conflicts over
railroads and American economic development, see GERALD BERK, ALTERNATIVE TRACKS (1992).
92. McClintock, supra note 1.
93. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the work of Megan J. McClintock on Civil War
pensions to discuss the relationship between pensions and perceived behaviorial patterns within
marriages).

94.

See WILLIAM H.

GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

9-119

(David Kinley ed., 1918) (providing a thorough analysis of military pensions from the colonial times
through the Civil War); WILLIAM H. GLASSON, HISTORY OF MILITARY PENSION LEGISLATION IN
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become a matter for considerable public controversy, but as a legal matter they were widely accepted as constitutional. At the federal level, pensions were constitutional because they were incident to the federal power
to conduct a war, and pensions provided an inducement to service." At
the state level, their constitutionality was much more open to question,
precisely because conducting a war was a power of the federal government. In addressing the constitutionality of soldiers' pensions, many of
the earliest state cases did not address the characteristic of the work; instead, payments to soldiers were addressed as a question of the circumstances in which the states could pay people for meeting obligations to
the federal government96 -- assisting the federal government in conducting
a war was no responsibility of the states. In later cases, the nature of the
work was addressed. Even as early as 1865, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court allowed the state to pay soldiers as a matter of gratitude for the
service they had given to their country. 7
In United States v. Hall," the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of military pensions as a whole while inquiring into the constitutionality of a statutory provision establishing criminal sanctions for
the embezzlement of pension funds by guardians." Justice Clifford found
a specific grant of power in the Constitution allowing pensions: Congress
could declare war,' raise and support armies,'"' and enact laws "neces-

1-68 (1900) (discussing pre-Civil War pensions); THEDA SKOCPOL,
PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS 105 (1992) (noting the expansion of the the use of pensions
from the time of the American Revolution to the Civil War).
95. See United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 351 (1878) (recognizing the constitutionality of
military pensions, in part, through the government's power to declare war, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
11, and the power to "raise and support Armies," id cl.12); see also COOLEY, supra note 89, at 74,
99-100.
96. See, e.g., Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass. 341 (1885); Kelly v. Marshall, 69 Pa. 319 (1871);
Hilbish v. Catherman, 14 N.Y. 154 (1870); Booth v. Town of Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118 (1864);
Tyson v. School Dirs., 51 Pa.9 (1865).
97. Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 658 (1865). In writing for the majority, Chief Justice
THE UNITED STATES

Dixon stated:
I think the consideration of gratitude alone to the soldier for his services, be he volunteer, substituted or drafted man, will sustain a tax for bounty money to be paid to him
or his family. Certainly no stronger consideration of gratitude can possibly exist than that

which arises from the hardships, privations and dangers which attend the citizen in the
military service of his country .... Who will say that the legislature may not, in consideration of such services .. . give to the soldier or his family a suitable bounty after his
enlistment, or even after his term of service has expired? I certainly cannot.
Brodhead, 19 Wis. at 687.
98. 98 U.S. 343 (1878).
99. Hall, 98 U.S. at 345-51.

100. Id. at 351; see U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, el. 11 ("Congress shall have power... [t]o declare
War ....
").
101. Hall, 98 U.S. at 351; see U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.12 ("Congress shall have power...
[t]o raise and support Armies ....
").
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sary and proper" to carry these powers into effect."2 Furthermore, the
long history of pensions was considered evidence of long-standing acceptance in the United States."3 If long accepted, pensions were unlikely
to be unconstitutional. Indeed, that they had been instituted in the first
Congress showed that the founders had approved of the pensions." Pensions and bounties, the Court reasoned, induced men to serve their country and were therefore necessary and proper to carrying on a war.' 5 If
bounties and pensions were legitimate, so were laws ensuring they went
to the people who deserved them, including soldiers' heirs.'" Justice Clifford wrote:
Bounties may be offered to promote enlistments, and pensions to the
wounded and disabled may be promised as like inducements. Past
services may also be compensated, and pensions may also be granted
to those who were wounded, disabled, or otherwise rendered invalids
while in the public service, even in cases where no prior promise was
made or antecedent inducement held out.'17
What made pensions from the federal government legitimate was a
loose understanding of exchange; men had served and could be paid,
even if they had not been promised the payment before they served.
Those payments became something akin to property-something they
could pass on to their children. A man's service in war earned him payments in a way that exempted his children from seeking their payments
as a matter of unearned charity from the state.
The early relationship between obligations of and to the states and
the "general" government emerged in cases discussing public subsidies
to the draft. After 1863, the first year of conscription, localities would
pay money to raise volunteers to meet their towns' obligation to the federal government for the draft. ' Alternatively, sometimes groups would
pay the money, and the township would reimburse the group."° The obli-

102. Hall, 98 U.S. at 351; see U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.18 ("Congress shall have power...
[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers....").
103. Hall, 98 U.S. at 346-51. As stated by Justice Clifford:
Power to grant pensions is not controverted, nor can it well be, as it was exercised by
the States and by the Continental Congress during the war of the Revolution; and the exercise of the power is coeval with the organization of the government under the present
Constitution, and has been continued without interruption or question to the present time.
Id. at 346.
104. Id. at 346, 350-51.
105. Seeid. at 351.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Booth v. Town of Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118, 119 (1864) (adjudging the constitutionality of using town funds in establishing bounties to assist in satisfying the town conscription
obligations); see also Hilbrish v. Catherman, 64 Pa. 154, 158 (1870).
109. See, e.g., Tyson v. School Dirs., 51 Pa. 9, 10-11 (1865) (discussing Halifax township
legislation establishing a bounty association and finding an act calling for the reimbursement of
funds expended by the bounty association unconstitutional).
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gation to the federal government was an obligation of the individual, not
the locality. Therefore the localities could not constitutionally assist individuals, reimbursing them for expenses they incurred in meeting their
draft obligations. But if a collectivity paid not just for its members but for
the obligations of the town as a whole, reimbursing the collectivity was
not spending for a private purpose but for the public purpose of assisting
the male citizenry as a whole (usually simply described as the citizenry)
to meet their obligations. State cases in the 1860s turned on these questions, not explicitly on the virtues of masculinity or concern for feminine
dependency. When Cooley wrote on taxation, he first emphasized the
limits on what the states could do,"' while elsewhere urging the importance of the federal government's recognizing the importance of dangerous service in war."'
The individual quality of service emerged in the later cases, long
after the, Civil War. In 1912 the Connecticut court held pensions were
unconstitutional because they would reward service long ago rendered,
quite possibly in some other state. ' 2 In 1913 the Kentucky court in Bosworth v. Harp"3 held that state pensions for Civil War soldiers were constitutional."' In so doing, the court ascribed to men, women and children
their proper roles, with men protecting women and children."' The court
justified payment to Confederate soldiers by arguing that they had fought
for a principle-the principle of state sovereignty." ' Fifty years after the
war, the court resurrected northern criticism of the South and of Dred
Scott.. in Bosworth, holding that such criticism justifiably alarmed Kentucky citizens in the 1850s."' Furthermore, the court referred to John
Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry as an effort to "massacre... the women
and children of the State,""' 9 describing the women and children as "defenseless."'" Pensions depended on masculine service which in turn
rested on a contrast with the intrinsic helplessness of women and children. In that context, payment for service was justified. In conclusion,
the court held:
So long as the courage of the battlefield or the risking of one's life for
his country is honored and it is the policy of the State to promote the
110.
111.
112.
113.

See COOLEY, supra note 89, at 76-83.
Id. atlO0.
Beach v. Bradstreet, 82 A. 1030, 1032-34 (Conn. 1912).
157 S.W. 1084 (Ky. 1913).

114. Bosworth, 157 S.W.at 1088 ("[A] tax is levied for public purposes [and therefore satisfies
constitutional requirements] where the money is used to pay a pension granted in consideration of
public services.").
115. Id. at 1086 (discussing John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry).
116. Id. at 1085-87.
117. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
118. Bosworth, 157 S.W.at 1087.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1086 (arguing that John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry "deeply stirred the South,
for the defenseless women and children would be the first to suffer").
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loyalty and patriotism of the people by fostering the martial spirit,
such services constitute a reasonable basis for classification. The
honor due to the true and2 the brave is not limited to those who are
'
successful in the struggle.1
for a losing
The dissenting justice rather mildly pointed out
22 that fighting
side in a civil war was not service to the state.'
The irony of emphasizing the masculinity inherent in the
dangerousness of war is that war puts men in a highly feminized position, making the maintenance of masculinity that much more difficult.
Judith Lewis Herman argues that men's psychological troubles resulting
from the trauma of war and women's psychological ills resulting often
from the trauma from domestic violence and sexual abuse lead to the
same complex of disorders. 23' Most poignantly, Pat Barker describes how
men's trauma in World War I resembled poor women's everyday lives:
Rivers [a military psychiatrist] had often been touched by the
way in which young men, some of them not yet twenty, spoke about
feeling like father to their men. Though when you looked at what they
did. Worrying about socks, boots, blisters, food, hot drinks. And that
perpetually harried expression of theirs. Rivers had only ever seen
that look in one other place: in the public wards of hospitals, on the
faces of women who were bringing up large families on very low incomes, women who, in their early thirties, could easily be taken for
fifty or more. It was the look of people who are totally responsible for
lives they have no power to save.
One of the paradoxes of the war-one of the many-was that
this most brutal of conflicts should set up a relationship between officers and men that was ... domestic. Caring. As Layard would undoubtedly have said, maternal. And that wasn't the only trick the war
had played. Mobilization. The Great Adventure. They'd been mobilized into holes in the ground so constricted they could hardly move.
And the Great Adventure-the real life equivalent of all the adventure
stories they'd devoured as boys-consisted of crouching in a dugout,
waiting to be killed. The war that had promised so much in the way of
"manly" activity had actually delivered "feminine" passivity, and on
a scale that their mothers and sisters had scarcely known.2

121. Id. at 1088.
122. In dissent, Justice Lassing noted:
I concede that the Confederate soldiers were brave men, and that they fought with a courage and determination that challenged the admiration of the civilized world; but by the
arbitrament of the sword every principle for with they contended was decided against
them. The integrity of the Union was preserved. While theirs was a brave, gallant, and
heroic fight, I cannot bring myself to believe that in their struggle for the lost cause they
rendered either the national or the state government a "public service" within the meaning of these words as found in the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 1088 (Lassing, J., dissenting).
123. JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND REcOVERY 7-32 (1992).
124. PAT BARKER, REGENERATION 107-08 (1993).
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Barker is discussing the First World War; the pensions I will discuss are
from the Civil War. But the scarcity that Barker notes, the inability to
care for people for whom one is responsible, also colored the Civil War.
Noting these continuities contributes to the understanding that drawing
rigid distinctions on the basis of gender is a matter of artifice.
V. PENSIONS AND THE NORMATIVE FAMILY

Men were concerned about enlisting for the army during the Civil
War because they did not want to leave wives and children without material support.'25 During the first year of the Civil War, the federal government received more than enough enlistments,'" but during the second
year, the government did not, and the generally accepted reason was that
men were concerned with what would happen to their families should
they die.' 7 When husbands, sons, and fathers were enrolled in the military and they had been the primary earners, their families could get public aid.' 8 But public aid was not available if breadwinners died.'29 Facing
the shortage of soldiers, in the summer of 1862 Congress expanded the
money available to support families: it made mothers and sisters eligible
for pensions and increased rates for widows and orphans.'30 In 1866,
Congress made fathers and brothers eligible for pensions as well."'
Pensions also expanded substantially between 1865 and 1890, in
part through relaxing evidentiary standards for proving family relationships. 2 McClintock argues, however, that the pensions laws eventually

125. McClintock, supra note 1, at 456-58.
126. Id. at 460. This changed with the realization that the war would not be ended upon a single
Union victory, but upon the "'complete conquest' of the South." Id. (quoting General Ulysses S.
Grant on his impressions after the Battle of Shiloh).
127. Id. at 461.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 463 & n.15 (citing Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, § 2, 12 Stat. 566, 567). Section 2 of
the Act of July 14, 1862 stated:
[I]f any officer or other person named in [section one] has died... or shall hereafter die,
by reason of any wound received or disease contracted while in the service of the United
States, and in the line of duty, his widow, or, if there be no widow, his child or children
under sixteen years of age, shall be entitled to receive the same pension as the husband or
father would have been entitled to... to commence from the death of the husband or father, and to continue to the widow during her widowhood, or to the child or children until
they severally attain to the age of sixteen years ....
Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, § 2, 12 Stat. 566, 567; see also id. § 3 (extending pension benefits to
dependant mothers, subject to some constraints, when a deceased serviceman did not leave a widow
nor legitimate children); id. § 4 (extending pension benefits to dependant, orphaned sisters when a
deceased serviceman did not leave a widow, legitimate children, nor a mother).
131. McClintock, supra note 1, at 463 (citing Act of June 6, 1866, ch. 106, § 12, 14 Stat. 56, 58
(amending the Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, § 4, 12 Stat. 566, 567-68) (extending pension benefits
to dependent fathers and brothers of deceased servicemen)).
132. Id. at 463 (citing Act of June 6, 1866, ch. 106, 14 Stat. 56; Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 234,
17 Stat. 566; Act of June 27, 1890, ch. 634, 26 Stat. 182 (relaxing evidentiary requirements for
proving pension eligibility)).
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instituted morality requirements for widows, making pensions not simply
a matter of entitlement for women via their association with men, but
also subjecting them to supervision by the state.'33
Husbands were presumed to be the primary support, so when mothers needed the pensions they had to explain why their husbands could not
support them.'" Fathers claiming support had to explain why they could
not support themselves.'35 In requiring explanation, the cases implicitly
state what was expected: that men support themselves and their wives.'36
As McClintock states, "the order of family responsibility encoded in
pension policy assumed that women first relied on husbands for support,
then on sons.' 37 When women worked for wages, their wages were generally lower than those of men, which in turn reinforced the need women
might have had for their sons' support."' Furthermore, parents applied for
pensions sometimes years after their sons had died; for when people aged
it became less likely they could work for wages.'39 With the increase of
time between the death of a son and application for a pension, evidentiary proof of support of the parents became more difficult. 4° Therefore,
the pension expansions during the 1870s and 1880s required a lesser
showing of support by allowing only a showing that a son would have
been willing to support his parents.'41 The government sometimes simply
assumed reciprocal parent/child obligations. For example, one mother
had actually supported her son until he went to war.'42 After that, she became unable to work due to disability. The argument that gained her a

133. Id. at 474-79 (discussing specific examples of state supervision of morality-based pension
requirements).
134. Id. at 467.
135. Id.
136. Cf id. at 467 & nn.25-26 (providing a number of examples of pension file reviews).
137. Id. at 469.
138.

KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 75; Joellen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy

of Woman Suffrage of the Voting Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 135 (1994).
139. See McClintock, supra note 1, at 469.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 468 (citing Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 234, § 13, 17 Stat. 566, 571). As stated by
section 13 of the 1873 act:
[A] mother shall be assumed to have been dependent upon her son.., if, at the date of
his death, she had no other adequate means of support than the ordinary proceeds of her
own manual labor and the contributions of said son or of any other persons not legally
bound to aid in her support; and if, by actual contributions or in any other way, the son
had recognized his obligations to aid in support of said mother, or was by law bound to
such support, and that a father or a minor brother or sister shall in like manner and under
like conditions, be assumed to have been dependent, except that the income which was
derived or derivable from his actual or possible manual labor shall be taken into account
in estimating a father's means of independent support ....
Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 234, § 13, 17 Stat. 566, 571.
For example, one woman received a pension despite the existence of only a single instance of
support by her son in two years because that son wrote a letter evidencing his desire to provide
support. See McClintock, supra note 1, at 468-69 & n.31 (describing the situation of Mary Harth).
142. See McClintock, supra note 1, at 470.
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pension was that surely a son would not have left a mother to rely on
charity once she was disabled.'"
By 1890, Congress eliminated evidentiary requirements by allowing
pensions for all parents, rather than requiring dependence.'" The justification was no longer that parents had relied on that support, but instead
that sons owed it to their parents and would have paid it had they not
died in the service of their country.' 5 The pretense, then, was that parents
were not receiving payments from the state, that the state was allowing
men to act in their appropriate masculine role, that of supporting their
parents.
For widows, the evidentiary question was one both of marriage to
the deceased soldier, and her continuing status as a widow.'" Documenting marriage was not simple when the records were those of nineteenthcentury localities. 47 Many people were married informally, and slaves
were often forbidden from marrying at all.'" Widows received pensions
as long as they did not remarry; however, the Bureau of Pensions (no
fools they) could see that this established an increased temptation to engage in sexual relations outside of marriage.'" Therefore they wanted to

143. Id. at 470-71.
144. Id. at 471 (citing Act of June 27, 1890, ch. 634, § 1, 26 Stat. 182, 182). Section 1 of the
1890 Act allowed the awarding of pensions to parents of deceased servicemen upon a showing that
no widows or minor children were left and the parents were "without other present means of support
than their own manual labor or the contributions of others not legally bound for their support." Act
of June 27, 1890, ch. 634, § 1, 26 Stat. 182, 182.
145. Id. at 471 (citing Notes of a Conference with Hon. William W. Dudley, Commissioner of
Pensions, H.R. MISC. Doc. No. 48-43, at 24-25 (1884)). William W. Dudley, the Commissioner of
Pensions in 1884, argued:
[S]o far as determining the question of dependence is concerned, the law in its present
form works great hardship in many deserving cases .... Now, I think the spirit of the
pension law ought to reach far enough to provide for a mother who afterwards became
dependent upon the labor of her own hands, or the assistance of others, upon the presumption that her son would have supported her had he lived.... [A]s the Government
has taken him away I hold that the Government ought to try to make up, to some extent at
least, to the dependent parent for the loss.
Notes of a Conference with Hon. William W. Dudley, Commissioner of Pensions, H.R. MIsc. Doc.
No. 48-43, at 24-25 (1884).
146. McClintock, supranote 1, at 471.
147. Id. at 472. While the Bureau of Pensions preferred marriage records to substantiate marriage claims, they accepted other forms of evidence including witness testimony, child baptism
records, or affidavits by marriage officiating individuals. Id. at 472 & n.39 (citing a number of
congressional documents addressing pension evidentiary standards).
148. Id. at 471-73.
149. Id. at 476-77 (citing Report of the Commissioner of Pensions for the Year 1868, H.R.
EXEC. Doc. 40-1, at 422 (3d Sess. 1868)). The Commissioner of Pensions noted:
Serious abuses of privilege and flagrant violations of morality on the part of claimants under the present system exist, which seem to require that the Commissioner be
clothed with discretionary power to adopt such means as may most certainly vindicate the
purposes of equal justice and good morals.
Widows, in increasing numbers, cohabit without marriage, refusing this solemn legal
sanction for fear of losing their pensions thereby. Others live openly in prostitution for
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supervise the morals of those widows receiving pensions, also contributing to the artifice that this was not state support but simply in lieu of a
particular man-one who had performed his masculine duty.'"
Given the lack of documentation of marriage, the Bureau of Pensions found themselves accepting evidence of cohabitation as evidence
of marriage.' But they did require evidence of cohabitation, not just its
assertion.'52 Claiming a pension when one had been a slave depended
almost wholly on evidence of co-habitation.'53 Sometimes that evidence
was supplemented with evidence of witnesses or, in one case, the testimony of the son of a former slaveholder that his father had allowed the
applicant and her deceased husband to live together.' In 1864, Congress
allowed pensions to those who were recognized as husband and wife and
who had lived together for two years. '
Allowing pensions to women whose marriages had been informal
meant that the Bureau felt compelled to concern itself with whether a
marriage had been genuine and enduring, or whether it had been a brief
affair.'56 Sometimes relationships fit into neither one nor the other category, and indeed, McClintock discusses one instance in which the Bureau of Pensions had to decide to which of two men a claimant had been
married.'57 Annice Morgan was married to Jackson for three years, when
he left to join the navy. "' She claimed to have believed he was dead, and
lived with Lemuel who then left to fight in the army.' Lemuel died,
prompting Morgan to claim a pension as his widow.'" But the Bureau of
Pensions discovered that she had lived with Jackson after the War, caring
for him until he died.'6 ' It was that marriage the Bureau decided had been

the same object. Thus is the government placed unwittingly in the strange attitude of offering a premium upon immorality, of which it should be relieved.
Report of the Commissioner of Pensionsfor the Year 1868, H.R. EXEC. DOC. 40-1, at 422, 450-51
(3d Sess. 1868).
150. See McClintock, supra note 1, at 476-77 (discussing the perceived need for and early
attempts at restricting pensions to widows on moral grounds).
151. Id. at 472 & n.41 (citing files from the Bureau of Pensions).
152. Id. ("By accepting cohabitation as proof of valid marriages, pension administrators were
following the lead of the antebellum judiciary ....(citing MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE
HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 75, 79-80 (1985))).
153. Id. at474.
154. Id. at 473 (describing the situation of Dilly Bostick).
155. For a fascinating discussion of what constituted evidence of a marriage among slaves, see
Lea Vandervelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J 1033, 1103-10 (1997).
156. McClintock, supra note 1, at 474.
157. Id. at 474-75 (citing documents in the pension file of Annice Morgan).
158. Id. at475.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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the genuine one because it was first and because she had lived with that
man longer.162
In making those choices, the Bureau of Pensions enforced a normative order of monogamy. According to McClintock, part of what persuaded the Bureau that someone had been a genuine wife was that the
woman had acted appropriately to the position of a feminine wife.'63 Annice Morgan, had nursed the man recognized to be her husband until he
died, which the Bureau of Pensions cited as evidence in its decision.'" In
another case, the claimant had children with the man she claimed to be
her husband, and she nursed him when he was ill.165 Those scripts of what
the Bureau of Pensions would recognize to be a legitimate union emphasized an enactment of femininity, one that we need not take to be natural
to marriage or to being a woman." But it was that work of caring, not
farm work or financial support, that pension applicants would cite to
when trying to persuade the Bureau that they were genuine wives. That
anyone was persuading the Bureau that someone was a genuine wife
demonstrates how much it was a script to be performed rather than a
position anyone could make up as they went along. Until 1882, the Bureau of Pensions could only terminate the pension of a widow on her
remarriage, not by virtue of her cohabiting with someone.'67 Despite efforts on the part of the Bureau of Pensions, Congress was reluctant to
allow them to supervise the home lives of pensioners." But after 1882,
the Bureau could terminate a woman's payments for cohabiting with a
man. 9 The law of state benefits, as the benefits expanded, codified normative heterosexual family life.
In a class I taught, students and I had discussed what marriage was.
A student in the class had friends who called themselves married but
because they were lesbian the marriage was not recognized by the state.
The student could not understand what the fuss was about in some Euro-

162. Id. As a result of finding that the Morgan-Jackson union represented the legitimate marriage, Morgan's pension claim, based upon the Morgan-Lemuel relationship, was dropped by the
pension examiner. Id.
163. Id. at 476 ("[B]ecause she acted like a wife, pension administrators restored her pension.").
164. Id. at 475 & n.46 (citing documents of the Bureau of Pensions and records of the Veterans'
Administration).
165. Id. at 476 (discussing the situation of Kate Staplin, as evidenced in Staplin's pension file).
166. See Butler, supra note 9, at 21.
167. McClintock, supra note 1, at 476-77; see, e.g., Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 247, § 7, 13 Stat.
387, 388 ("[On the remarriage of any widow receiving a pension, such pension shall terminate, and
shall not be renewed should she again become a widow.").
168. McClintock, supra note 1, at 477 & n.50 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 40 Cong., 3d Sess. 678
(1869) (statement of Rep. Perham); id. at 679 (statement of Rep. Boyden); id. at 641 (statement of
Rep. Schenck); id. at 641 (statement of Ebon Ingersoll)).
169. Id. at 477 (citing Act of Aug. 7, 1882, ch. 438, 22 Stat. 345, 345 (stating that "open and
notorious adulterous cohabitation" will be grounds for termination of pension benefits)).
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pean Court of Human Rights cases;17 if people called themselves married, they were. Some students tried to define the essential qualities of
marriage, such as monogamy, or living together with affection over the
course of the marriage. Some mentioned that the purpose of marriage
was reproduction, so the capacity for sexual reproduction must be present. Other students quickly rejected this, saying reproduction might once
have been the point of marriage but it no longer was. The solution to
some students was to allow anyone who wants to call themselves married
to do so, and to abolish the civil status.
The students are not alone in finding a teleology to marriage. John
Finnis argues that sexuality is only properly deployed when it is open to
the possibility of reproduction; otherwise sexual partners would be using
each other simply for pleasure, not as ends in themselves. 7' Marriage,
according to Finnis, is a non-instrumental communion, offering companionship between two people.' Openness to procreation is "the intrinsic fulfillment of [that] communion;"'7 3 because the communion does not
require children, marriage partners can have that communion even if they
cannot have children. That would seem to suggest that gay and lesbian
marriage would fit in his teleology, but it does not. Procreation between
partners is impossible as a matter of biology within gay and lesbian couples, not just an accident of infertility. Finnis finds this distinction persuasive,' 4 though possibly infertile heterosexual couples do not, as Dan
Savage's discussion of adoption points out.'75 Finnis's analysis is explicit
about the teleology of marriage;' 6 he might well have approved of the
Bureau of Pensions' effort to decide who was truly married.
I then suggested to students that the criteria of affection and monogamy might at times be aspirations, though that was not always the case,
and that the criteria certainly did not describe married reality all the time
for most married couples. Marriage, to be wholly bare bones and pedantic about it, is nothing more or less than a legally recognized status. To
say that it is anything other than that has often implied a teleology along
the lines of what Finnis argues for, one based in procreation. From the
data McClintock provides, marriage has been enforced via state benefits

170. Supranational courts have in recent years addressed what constitutes a marriage. The
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) judges disputes under the European Convention on Human Rights that arise in countries that are signatories to the Convention. The Convention includes a
right to family life, and under that right applicants have challenged laws that in effect forbid transsexuals from marrying based on birth registration and prohibitions on same sex marriage. See
Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5 (1990).
171. John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics &
PUB. POL'Y 11,27-29 (1995).

172. Id. at 27.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 27-29, 30.
175. See Gay Adoption, supra note 11.
176. See Finnis, supranote 171, at 27-30 (addressing the teleology of marriage in part through
an examination of ancient Greek thoughts on homosexuality).
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to fit with a teleology, and not only based in procreation.'77 There was a
proper way to be a wife and a proper way to be married. Such propriety
involves not just a particular variety of sexual intercourse, but instead
caretaking through illness and long term living together. That too would
seem to suggest that gay and lesbian partnerships could count for the
purposes of state benefits, but the caretaking is taken to be appropriate
for women, not men, and more specifically, to a woman taking care of a
man.
I next address shifts in the evaluation of pensions for firemen, where
the courts turned from evaluating payments as a matter of justified exchange between those particular groups who benefited to an evaluation
of public service and its hazards to those who engaged in it. Like evaluation of the constitutionality of state pensions for soldiers, changes represented shifts in evaluations of the obligations of citizenship and the relationship between citizen and government.
VI. FIREMEN AND POLICEMEN

Before the mid-nineteenth century, employees were responsible for
only a small percentage of the work done on behalf of the state; even
police were not instituted until the mid to late-nineteenth century.' Major cities (such as New York) relied on volunteer firemen and compensated them in two forms: first, firefighters were exempt from military
service,'79 and second, municipalities taxed fire insurance companies and
allocated the money directly to firemen's charities, which often meant
old age homes.'8 ° The military exemption demonstrates how much this
service was tied to military service in the public characteristics it assumed. To the extent that military pensions rested on a justification that
they induced men to serve by guaranteeing their dependents would be
cared for, and that they rewarded courage and bravery, pensions for
firemen could be understood to rest on the same basis.
The second benefit, allocating money to charities, was challenged,
even before the Civil War. As shown by the following discussion, the
courts addressed what constituted a public purpose. In characterizing
what was a public purpose, courts initially drew on an understanding of
exchange, but not between the general public and the firefighters; instead, the courts noted that the insurance companies benefited from firefighting, so it was equitable to make the insurance companies pay.

177. See McClintock, supra note 1, at 471-79 (discussing mid-nineteenth-century perceptions
of marriage as articulated by Congress and enforced by the Bureau of Pensions).
178. See ERIC MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA, 1860-1920, at 31 (1981).
179. See H.L. Wilgus, Constitutionalityof Teachers' Pensions Legislation, 12 MICH. L. REV.
27,31(1913).
180. Id. at32.
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New York had provided for firemen since colonial times, first providing exemptions from military service for serving as firemen, then
providing public funds for pensions.'8 ' From 1849, the legislature required that two percent of the premiums collected by foreign insurance
companies in any city be paid to the fire department or corporation of
firemen of the city.'12 In an 1854 case, Fire Department v. Noble,'83 this
tax was challenged as an unconstitutional taking of property for a private
purpose because it benefited a private corporation."" In Noble, the court
held that it did not.' In 1852, Illinois enacted a provision similar to New
York's, in which tax revenues from insurance payments made to companies incorporated outside Illinois would go to those who were injured
and members of the private firemen's association.' This was immediately challenged as a violation of public purpose requirements, and in
1859 the Illinois Supreme Court in Firemen's Benevolent Ass'n v.
Lounsbury,'87 upheld it as serving a public purpose.'88
In addressing the constitutionality of these targeted taxes, these
courts did not discuss masculinity and dangers of service; they did not
address the worthiness of beneficiaries at all. Instead, they addressed
taxation as a matter of what historian Einhorn calls "segmented logic":'89
those who benefit should pay, and there is little sense of a more common
general benefit. The courts reasoned that insurance companies were the
direct beneficiaries of firefighting, and therefore states could require
them to pay.' 9 As Robin Einhorn notes, this form of taxation served two
purposes: it raised money for the Firemen's Benevolent Association, but
it did so in a way that gave a competitive advantage to local insurance
companies.'9
The cases addressed by states after the Civil War spoke much more
of general public benefit, and indeed Einhorn argues that the Civil War
brought a sense of common purpose to politics.' 2 It is in this later period
that cases discussed the characteristics required of beneficiaries, emphasizing the importance of the courage required for the work and the

181. Id. at 31-32.
182. Act of March 30, 1849, ch. 178, 1849 N.Y. Laws 239. Previously, the state collected two
percent of the foreign insurance premiums, but the collected money was paid directly to the state.
Wilgus, supra note 179, at 32.
183. 3 E.D. Smith 440 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1854); see also Fire Dep't v. Wright, 3 E.D. Smith 453
(N.Y. Ct.C.P. 1854) (utilizing the Noble decision).
184. See Noble, 3 E.D.Smith at 453.
185. Id. at451-52.
511, 511-12 (1859) (describing the
186. See Firemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill.
Act of June 21, 1852).
187. 21111.511 (1859).
188. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. at 515-16.
189. EIm*oRN, supra note 2, at 25-26, 149-50; see Lounsbury, 21111. at 515-16.
190. See Lounsbury, 21 111. at 513; cf Noble, 3 E.D. Smith at 451-52.
191. EIIIoRN, supra note 2, at 149-50.
192. Id. at 224.
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women and children depending on those who risked their lives.9 No talk
of the duty of men or the courage required of them appeared in the early
cases, only a straightforward understanding of the benefits accruing to
fire insurance companies and their concomitant obligations.'" When the
cases began to analyze the courage of men and dependence of women is
when, as Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon argue, the meaning of wage
labor first came to connote masculinity and independence rather than
dependence.'95 The discussion of masculinity appeared as sexual identities were beginning to be understood as fixed characteristics of human
beings, rather than as descriptions of behavior in which people engaged.
I would not argue that the general intellectual change in perceptions of
sexual identity caused the changes in how the courts understood the
value of pensions. Rather, the Civil War transformed relations of federalism and of politics enough to account for the transformation in focus.
However, the heightened sense of masculinity and femininity in the cases
does fit with the naming and fixing of sexual identities that John
96
D'Emilio and Estelle Freedman ascribe to the late-nineteenth century.1
A touchstone case out of New York in 1883, Trustees of the Exempt
Firemen's Benevolent Fund v. Roome, once again challenged a tax on
private insurers to create a pension fund for volunteer firemen.'9 By this
time, localities were beginning to rely on employees for work rather than
on the older system of having direct beneficiaries pay for services. However, Roome raised a challenge to the older system of pensions. One of
the first and most important civil service cases under the anti-gift provisions in state constitutions, therefore, actually addressed older spending
forms rather than new funding directly from city councils or state legislatures to employees. Even so, the court held that the pensions were constitutional, explaining:
'"

With the growth of the city the number of the firemen increased, and
the amount and danger of their service. The old engines, moved with
difficulty and cumbrous and rude in construction, gave place to better
machines, and the service improved as the demand upon it grew. The
dangers of the work were obvious, and a courage and daring which
has gone into history began to leave behind it men who were maimed

193. See, e.g., Trustees of the Exempt Firemen's Benevolent Fund v. Roome, 93 N.Y. 313,
319-20 (1883); see also infra note 197-199 and accompanying discussion (examining Roome).
194. See Lounsbury, 211 II1.at 511 (discussing the constitutionality of benefit legislation, but
failing to discuss the courage of firemen and hazards of service); Fire Dep't v. Noble, 3 E.D. Smith
440 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1854) (discussing firemen's pension issues in a very antiseptic manner).
195. Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the
U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNs 309, 316-18 (1994).
196. See D'EMILIo & FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at 223-29.
197. 93 N.Y. 313 (1883).
198. Roome, 93 N.Y. at 313.
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and crippled in the public service, and widows and orphans deprived
of their natural protectors and reduced to poverty and want.' 99
The tax was therefore not a grant of a special privilege to a private corporation or association, nor was it a gift from the state to a private undertaking. The firemen were not state employees and indeed in that sense
they constituted a private organization. But drawing on an older legal
tradition, whether one was in public service or not depended on the
function one served, not the accident of who was an employer or owner.
Roome focused less on the justice of making the insurance companies
pay for the firemen, choosing instead to highlight the needs of dependents and bravery of men. Masculinity implied dangerousness and financially providing for a heterosexual family.
The world of firemen was actually very male-defined. In the cities,
firemen did not just join together to put out fires. Fire companies were
outgrowths of working men's clubs.' They staged minstrel shows, putting on persona along with blackface that they did not assume in daily
life.2°' Bowery boys, the New York City working class men, some of
whom were volunteer firemen, lived in a very male world, where their
primary identifications were with other men.' Bowery boys also went
out with women, and were known for their rakish ways."3 Defining masculinity may have required dangerousness, but in return the world in
which men spent their time could be very male-defined.
States also began to consider pensions for policemen. In the earlytwentieth century, Illinois considered expanding pensions for police to
police matrons and to police operators, who worked within the police
station.' ° Members of the state legislature threatened a constitutional case
against the expansion; the Chicago Tribune argued that the only police
jobs that deserved pensions were those which were dangerous, thereby
excluding both operators and police matrons. 5 In 1916 the Illinois Supreme Court held police pensions to be constitutional, saying that it was
a way of "retiring from the public service those who have become incapacitated from performing the duties as well as they might be performed

199. Id. at 320; see Wilgus, supra note 179, at 33.
200. See ERIC LoTr, LOVE AND THEFr 81-85 (1995); SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC
259-61 (1984).
201. LOTT, supra note 200, at 80-85.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 81.
204. See Act of July 1, 1911, 1911 ILL. LAWS 170 (amending the Act of April 29, 1887, 1887
ILL. LAWS 122, by adding section 3a which extended police pensions to police matrons); see also
Lyons v. Police Pension Bd., 99 N.E. 337, 337-38 (111.1912) (discussing the original Act and the
amendment and finding the amendment constitutional).
205. House Firm on Changes in Police Pension Bills, ILL. ST. J., May 10, 1911, at 1; Police
Pensions Hit Snag, CHI. TRIB., May 10, 1911, at 4.
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by younger or more vigorous men. ' 2 In 1921, the Alabama Supreme
Court also praised the work of the hazardous services as worthy of reward:
[T]he legislature may provide a system, whereby municipalities ... can
increase in efficiency a department designed to protect life and property, by providing for the members of its fire departments, their wives
and little ones, after the term of active service has been ended, either by
death or age, to the end that the public may retain in this hazardous
service men of the most faithful and efficient class ... The compensation thus paid, by whatever name called, is not a gratuity .... 207
Both association in a heterosexual family and proper masculinity
were present in the Alabama court's explanation of what made pensions
allowable. First, state benefits were available as earned to women who
were married to firemen and to their children. 8° Second, masculinity was
characterized as a question of hazardous service; that hazardous service
is what earned a pension.'m Even having earned a pension, a man could
be in a somewhat ambiguous position: they were often paid pensions
because they had been disabled or they were too old to serve. State pensions were a recognition of masculinity but they could shade into compensation for feminizing injuries."'
It would be possible to characterize the cases concerning pensions
for firefighters and policemen as cases concerning gender, rather than
sexual orientation, were one to focus on the distinction. The discussion
of hazardousness--of facing danger-would seem to fit neatly within
what we have long thought of as characterizations of gender. However,
such gender stereotyping operated within a regime of heterosexual family life: the state provided pensions for the wives and children.
Dangerousness was masculine in the context of having a wife and child
to care for; women and children were the backdrop against which men
enacted masculinity. The masculine characteristics were difficult to understand outside a governing system of heterosexual families, just as the
feminine characteristics of caring and nursing were defined as wifely
characteristics in the cases concerning who was a wife for the purposes
of military pensions. Caring and nursing for a man made one his wife;
they did not make one a woman.
Women who were not wives, but rather mothers without husbands,
were forced to rely on other forms of state relief, depending on the reason a woman did not have a husband. Nineteenth-century tort litigation
occasionally compensated women who had lost husbands in industrial
206. People ex rel. Kroner v. Abbott, 113 N.E. 696, 698 (El. 1916).
207. Cobbs v. Home Ins. Co., 91 So. 627, 629 (Ala. Ct. App. 1921).
208. Cobbs, 91 So. at 629.
209. Id.
210. See Seth Koven, Remembering and Dismemberment: Crippled Children, Wounded Soldiers, and the Great War in Great Britain, 99 AM. HIST. REv. 1167, 1191-92 (1994) (discussing
injury, war, and feminization in Britain).
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accidents."' Local systems of poor relief and almshouses also sometimes
housed women." 2 After 1900, activists argued that women with children
to support should receive payment from the state. While advocates called
these pensions, in line with soldiers' and civil servants' pensions," 3 in the
early-twentieth century states more often considered them unearned
charitable payments. I will outline questions concerning the constitutionality of these pensions in the next section.
VII. PENSIONS FOR WIDOWS

Between 1910 and 1920, forty states instituted payments to single
mothers, though the funding in most states meant that very few women
actually received payments."' Some advocates argued that payments
should be seen as something earned, that women were doing a public
service in raising children, and that the polity had an obligation to encourage mothers to do a good job of rearing children by paying them for
the work. 5 However, most states enacted the mothers' pensions on the
basis of charity, paid to women who could not otherwise support themselves and who proved themselves worthy. 6 In Illinois pensions were
enacted on a more universal basis," 7 but they were quickly changed to a
much more restrictive program."8 In 1914, Arizona also enacted a broad
211.

See

SKOCPOL,

supra note 83, at 290.

212. Cf. ROBERT H. BREMNER, THE PUBLIC GOOD: PHILANTHROPY AND WELFARE IN THE
CIVIL WAR ERA 150-53 (discussing poorhouses and other means of housing the indigent).
213. See MOLLY LADD-TAYLOR, MOTHER-WORK: WOMEN, CHILD WELFARE, AND THE STATE,

1890-1930, at 143-48 (1994).
214. See id. at 148 (noting the financial difficulties associated with the mothers' pensions);
SKOCPOL, supra note 83, at 424 (noting the emergence of mothers' pensions in forty states by the
year 1920).
215. See LADD-TAYLOR, supra note 213, at 135-36, 143-48; see also SKOCPOL, supra note 83,
at 426 (describing the fears of Mary Richmond, a prominent charity offical, that mothers' pensions
evidenced the "same mixture of motive"-payment of a debt versus charity-as experienced with
soldiers' pensions). Ladd-Taylor differentiates between three groupings of early-twentieth-century
advocates: sentimental matemalists, progressive maternalists, and feminists. See LADD-TAYLOR,
supra note 213, at 7. In discussing women's pensions, she notes that all three groups supported the
pensions, but for different reasons-sentimental maternalists sought to preserve maternal dignity,
assist poor women in fulfilling parental responsibilities, and prevent juvenile delinquency; progressive matemalists viewed the pensions as a means of coping with poverty; and feminists as a means
of renumeration. Id. As a result of these different rationales underlying the groups' support of mothers' pensions, the maternalists sought pension coverage only for those individuals without the "support of a male breadwinner," while the feminists argued for pension coverage for all mothers. Id.
216. See LADD-TAYLOR, supra note 213, at 138.
217. See ILL. REV. STAT. § 175 (Hurd 1912). In pertinent part, the Illinois statute, the first of its
kind, stated:
If the parent or parents of such dependent or neglected child are poor and unable to
properly care for the said child, but are otherwise proper guardians and it is for the welfare of such child to remain at home, the court may enter an order finding such facts and
fixing the amount of money necessary to enable the parent or parents to properly care for
such child, and thereupon it shall be the duty of the County Board ... to pay to such parent or parents... the amount so specified ....
Id.; see also SKOCPOL, supra note 83, at 428.
218. See ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 37, 3416(l)-(21) (Callaghan 1913-1916); see SKOCPOL, supra
note 83, at 429. For example, the amended version limits pension disbursements to "[a] woman
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pension plan which included a provision for the elderly.2"9 Two years
later, the Arizona Supreme Court struck down these pensions in State
Board v. Buckstegge, 2 ° because, in part, they did not adhere to a wholly
charitable framework. 22' Because the program was not closely enough
means-tested, it gave support to too many women." The Chief Justice
writing for the majority stated:
I think the theory upon which a pension system of this kind
must be sustained is that the state owes a duty to take care of the unfortunate members of society who, by reason of age or mental or
physical infirmity, are unable to care for themselves, and are not the
owners and possessors of property sufficient to sustain them from
want and beggary. Certainly a citizen and taxpayer ought not to be
made or required to help pay pensions to those who have enough and to
spare of the world's goods. I can think of no principle of law or jus2
tice that could be invoked to sustain a law that required him to do so. 2
In other words, a plea of total dependency was the price of social spending outside service to the state. Women as mothers and not wives of civil
servants or soldiers were analogous to the ill and disabled rather than to
civil servants or soldiers. By its reasoning in Buckstegge, the Arizona
Supreme Court did not accept that women were serving the state by
raising children.2
In sharp contrast with some of the soldiers' pension cases, courts
addressing mothers' pensions did not provide homage to the work of
mothering as that evidenced in courts addressing the patriotic work of
soldiering. In Buckstegge, the appellants challenged the program as not

whose husband is dead or whose husband has become incapacitated for work by reason of physical
or mental infirmity ... provided such woman has had a previous residence for three years in the
county... and is the mother of a child or children." ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 37, 1 3416(2).
219. See Act of Nov. 3, 1914, 1915 Ariz. Sess. Laws 10, reprinted in State Bd. v. Buckstegge,
158 P. 837, 838 (Ariz. 1916). The Arizona law stated in part:
[Iln order to care for aged people and people incapable of earning a livelihood by reason
of physical infirmities, and widows or wives whose husbands are in penal institutions or
insane asylums, they being mothers of children who are under the age of sixteen (16)
years, a system of pensioning is hereby established.
Act of Nov. 3, 1914, 1915 Ariz. Sess. Laws 10 § 2.
220. State Bd. v. Buckstegge, 158 P. 837 (Ariz. 1916).
221. Buckstegge, 158 P. at 841-42. The court also recognized that the title of the legislation
submitted to voters did not adequately convey that the pension plan would supplant almshouses
currently used to house the poor, in violation of the Arizona Constitution. Id. at 840-41; see ARIZ.
CONST. art. IV, § 13 ("Every Act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected
therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title .....
222. See Buckstegge, 158 P. at 841-42.
223. Id. at 842 (Ross, C.J.).
224. See id.
225. Compare, e.g., id. at 838-42 (addressing mothers' pensions), with Bosworth v. Harp, 157
S.W. 1084, 1085, 1087-88 (Ky. 1913) (addressing soldiers' pensions). For example, the Bosworth
court, in finding that soldiers' pensions applied to soldiers fighting for the Confederacy, ended their
decision with the following statement:
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generous enough, and as replacing almshouses with inadequate payments. 6 In emphasizing that point, the appellants likened pensions to
leaving a baby on the street with $6 pinned to her (the monthly amount
2 27
paid for a child), and saying the father was no longer liable for support.
That is, the state was directly taking the place of a man. The state could
not meet its obligations with a set monthly payment anymore than a father might have.
Women receiving pensions had to conform to an image of heterosexuality, but they need not have a man around. In return for payments,
the state often provided quite intrusive supervision, checking to see if
one had a man in the house (which was unacceptable). Protection had
its price; when one gains protection, one depends on the protector's
rules.'
Pensions law was one arena that structured what it meant to be a
family. What it meant to be a family reinforced heterosexual norms:
women lived with men and were dependent on them, and children were
dependent on fathers' income and mothers' care. Men were independent,
including when they called upon state payments, because they had
earned those payments. The task for this article has been to make some
move toward understanding what has marked straightness, linking that to
the emergence of individualized state benefits in the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries. Because we live in a world where straight culture dominates, we are, on the whole, well aware of these markers. I
simply want to set these characteristics into a different context, one that
highlights their connection to straightness. I would not argue that the
availability of state benefits cause heterosexuality or is a primary reason
for men and women living together. I only want to note how state programs might reinforce it.
The late-nineteenth century was a time in which sexual identities
were becoming less flexible and more obviously marked, in particular for
gay men. For wealthy women, sexual ambiguity was possible, and inSo long as the courage of the battle field or the risking of one's life for his country is
honored, and it is the policy of the state to promote the loyalty and patriotism of the people by fostering the martial spirit, such services constitute a reasonable basis for classification. The honor due to the true and the brave is not limited to those who are successful
in the struggle. Greece still honors the Spartans who defended the pass at Thermopylae.
The names of Wallace and his comrades are yet household words in Scotland. They who
died at the Alamo are honored of all Americans. The state may show that the republic is
not ungrateful to these men not only by erecting monuments to them when dead or placing flowers on their graves, but it may with equal propriety gladden their hearts while
living and in their infirmnity give them bread.
Bosworth, 157 S.W. at 1088.
226. See Buckstegge, 158 P. at 841.
227. Brief for Appellant, State Bd. v. Buckstegge, 158 P. 837 (Ariz. 1916) (No. 1456) (on file
with author).
228. See SKOCPOL, supra note 83, at 467-68.
229. See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY
168-70 (1995) (discussing the state and protection).
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deed virtually necessary for a career, since it was difficult to care for a
man and children while also being active in, for example, social welfare
work. Linda Gordon notes that many of the white women active in social
welfare in national political networks were unmarried. ' o While the latenineteenth century might have provided some flexibility for upper class
women, legal practices were working at fixing identity, and state payments contributed. Megan J. McClintock argues that the administration
of civil war pensions fixed a normative family, one that had all the trappings of state-recognized legitimacy."1
VIII. CONCLUSION
The late-nineteenth century developed an understanding of homosexuality based on a medical model in which it was a distinctive perversion and a quality of individuals. The effect was to both make people
more reticent in personal letters and, perhaps paradoxically, to make
sexuality more often spoken of as a way of policing it. At the same time,
governing was becoming less a matter of ensuring that those who benefited paid and more a matter of ensuring that what the government did
was a matter of general benefit. The more direct relationship implied in
the revised supervision of public purpose-from whether a tax targeted
on fire companies, or reimbursement to a collectivity for raising draft
substitutes, was public to whether the individual men had earned the pension from the payments-meant that qualities implied in the work, rather
than only the nature of the exchange, would be examined. Celebrating
qualities required to be a soldier or fireman accompanied, neither causing
nor caused by, changes in political relations more generally.
Clearly, the cases we have seen from the latter part of the nineteenth
and the early-twentieth centuries discuss a marked femininity and masculinity. These markers of dangerousness and dependence would usually
be discussed as markers of gender rather than sexual orientation, and
indeed I have done so in another article. "2. Linda Gordon and Nancy
Fraser expand our understanding of what is implied by gender by noting
how dependence and independence have been interpreted in changing
ways historically, arguing that they have been marked as feminine and
masculine. 33

230. GORDON, supra note 77, at 111-13. It was more common, however, for African American
activist women to be married and have children. Id.
231. McClintock, supra note 1, at 479-80; see also discussion supra Part V (addressing pensions and the normative family through a discussion of McClintock's work on Civil War and postCivil War pensions).
232. Sterett, supra note 84, at 315-18 (discussing women as dependents of men and recognizing this as a marker of gender, rather than sexual orientation).
233. Fraser & Gordon, supra note 195, at 316-18.
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Masculinity and femininity were, in the pensions cases, associated
with living in a heterosexual family. Women were dependent-that was
an acceptable feminine characteristic; but they were dependent on men as
"their natural protectors," as the New York Firemen's cases had it. I
would argue we could as easily see these cases as being about sexual
orientation; that is, they concern how to be a heterosexual man or woman
and how to keep one's part in the marriage bargain. Switching frames
from gender to sexual orientation is not a simple substitution of one term
for another, as though neither signifies very much. For as we have seen,
markers of dependence went along with the fact that clients were women,
which in turn went along with their having been dependent on a man-a
man who could no longer be depended upon. Andrew Koppelman argues
that sexual orientation discrimination is "really" gender discrimination,
because gay men and women are discriminated against on the basis of
traits associated with femininity or masculinity. 5 I would argue that
there is no "really," except for the convenience of making a plausible
claim in Title VII.
Gender discrimination cannot be wholly seen as a matter of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, because feminine, straight
women are sometimes discriminated against precisely because of their
femininity. But because evaluating sexual orientation is a matter of
measuring "proper" ways to behave, it is about the imposition of gender.
We can choose to highlight or emphasize one framework over another,
but to say something is one or the other implies a preexisting differentiation of the categories I find implausible.

234. Trustees of the Exempt Firemen's Benevolent Fund v. City of New York, 93, N.Y. 313,
320 (1883) ("The dangers of [firefighting] were obvious, and a courage and daring which has gone
into history began to leave behind it men who were maimed and crippled in the public service, and
widows and orphans deprived of their natural protectors and reduced to poverty and want." (emphasis added)).
235. See discussion supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.

